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Biases in randomized trials:  
a conversation between trialists and epidemiologists 
Abstract 
Trialists and epidemiologists often employ different terminology to refer to biases in 
randomized trials and observational studies, even though many biases have a similar structure 
in both types of study. We use causal diagrams to represent the structure of biases, as 
described by the Cochrane Collaboration for  randomized trials, and provide a translation to 
the usual epidemiologic terms of confounding, selection bias, and measurement bias. This 
structural approach clarifies that an explicit description of the inferential goal—the intention-
to-treat effect or the per-protocol effect—is necessary to assess risk of bias in the estimates. 
Being aware of each other’s terminologies will enhance communication between trialists and 
epidemiologists when considering key concepts and methods for causal inference. 
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Introduction 
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and observational studies are used to assess the 
causal effects of medical interventions.1 By definition, treatment strategies are randomly 
assigned in RCTs but not in observational studies. Randomization, which prevents bias due to 
non-comparability between groups, is exploited in full when the data analysis follows the 
“intention-to-treat” principle. 
Another difference between some RCTs and observational studies is masking 
(blinding) of trial participants and personnel, which can be achieved by using a placebo that 
is indistinguishable from the active treatment. Masking prevents differential care during 
follow-up, accounts for nonspecific effects associated with receiving an intervention (placebo 
effects), may facilitate blinding of outcome assessors, and may improve adherence.     
Widespread use of masking and of intention-to-treat analyses became established by 
regulatory requirements, which privileged intention-to-treat analyses of double-blind 
placebo-controlled RCTs to assess the efficacy of drugs before licensing. However, masking 
is sometimes not feasible (e.g., in surgical trials), and may not even be desirable (e.g., in 
pragmatic trials whose goal is estimating effects in real-world conditions). An intention-to-
treat analysis is not feasible if trial participants are lost to follow-up and has disadvantages in 
safety and non-inferiority trials.2 
Discussions about the differences between RCTs and observational studies can be 
complicated by the different terminology employed by trialists and epidemiologists.3 Trialists 
often use the taxonomy of bias typified by the Cochrane tool for assessing risk of bias in 
RCTs: selection bias, performance bias, detection bias, attrition bias, reporting bias, and other 
bias.4,5 Epidemiologists, on the other hand, tend to use the categories confounding, selection 
bias, and measurement (or information) bias.1,6,7 
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Causal diagrams have been used extensively to represent biases in epidemiological 
studies.8-14 These diagrams, represented as directed acyclic graphs, are comprised of variables 
(nodes) and arrows (directed edges). The absence of an arrow pointing from variable A to 
variable B indicates that variable A does not have a direct causal effect on B. A key 
advantage of causal diagrams is that they provide a mathematically rigorous yet intuitive tool 
for deducing the statistical independencies implied by the lack of causal arrows.1,8,9  
Here we use causal diagrams to represent the biases described in the Cochrane Risk of 
Bias Tool, and provide a translation to the epidemiologic terms of confounding, selection 
bias, and measurement bias. For simplicity, we focus on individually-randomized (non-
cluster-randomized), parallel group (non-crossover) trials that compare two time-fixed 
treatment strategies. We start by reviewing the main types of causal effect that are of interest 
in RCTs.  
 
Intention-to-treat effect and per-protocol effect 
The intention-to-treat effect is the effect of treatment assignment (or allocation).15 Consider 
an RCT in which HIV-positive individuals are assigned to either initiating a new treatment 
Z=1 or to continuing on their existing treatment Z=0, and are followed until death or the end 
of follow-up at 5 years. The outcome of interest is 5-year mortality Y (1: yes, 0: no). The 
intention-to-treat effect is unbiasedly estimated by an intention-to-treat analysis that 
compares the mean outcome between those assigned to Z=1 and Z=0. For example, the 
intention-to-treat effect on the causal risk difference scale is unbiasedly estimated by the 
difference of the risks in the groups Z=1 and Z=0, which are readily computed from the study 
data. 
 The magnitude of the intention-to-treat effect in a particular study depends on the 
magnitude and type of adherence to the assigned treatment strategies. To see this, consider 
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two RCTs with identical eligibility criteria and that compare the same two strategies. In the 
first RCT, only half of the patients assigned to the new treatment (Z=1) end up actually taking 
it (A=1); the other half do not take it (A=0). In the second RCT, all patients assigned to 
treatment take it (that is, patients with Z=1 also have A=1). In both studies all patients 
assigned to Z=0 cannot take the new treatment because it is not available outside the study 
(that is, patients with Z=0 also have A=0). Even if the effect of the new treatment is identical 
in both studies, the intention-to-treat effect will generally differ between the two studies. For 
example, the intention-to-treat effect will be closer to the null in the first RCT than in the 
second one if the effect of treatment goes in the same direction (beneficial or harmful) for all 
patients, and more beneficial in the first RCT than in the second one if adherers tend to be 
those for whom treatment has a beneficial effect and nonadherers tend to be those for whom 
treatment has a harmful effect.1 If the above RCTs were head-to-head trials that assigned 
participants to two active treatments, then the intention-to-treat effect in the first RCT might 
also be either closer or further from the null than that in the second RCT.2 
 An alternative to the intention-to-treat effect that is not affected by the study-specific 
adherence to treatment is the per-protocol effect, that is, the causal effect that would have 
been observed if all patients had adhered to the protocol of the RCT. Unfortunately, valid 
estimation of the per-protocol effect in the presence of imperfect adherence generally requires 
untestable assumptions.16 
Two common approaches to estimate the per-protocol effect are (i) comparing the 
outcomes of those who took treatment A=1 and treatment A=0 (regardless of the treatment 
they were assigned to), e.g., Pr[Y=1|A=1] − Pr[Y=1|A=0], and (ii) comparing the outcomes of 
those who took treatment A=1 among those assigned to Z=1 and treatment A=0 among those 
assigned to Z=0, e.g., Pr[Y=1|A=1, Z=1] − Pr[Y=1|A=0, Z=0].) Approach (i) is often referred 
to as an “as treated” analysis and approach (ii) as a “per protocol” analysis.2,8 Neither 
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approach is generally valid to estimate the per-protocol effect, as we discuss below. (G-
estimation and instrumental variable methods can sometimes be used to estimate some form 
of per-protocol effects even in the presence of unmeasured confounders in Figures 1c and 
1d.16,17) 
Although “as treated” and “per-protocol” analyses are potentially biased, the per-
protocol effect may be of greater interest to patients and their clinicians than the intention-to-
treat effect. We now discuss how the potential for bias in effects estimated from RCTs 
depends on whether the goal is to estimate the per-protocol or the intention-to-treat effect. 
 
Cochrane bias domains and causal diagrams 
The Cochrane Risk of Bias Tool for randomized trials covers six domains of bias.4,5 In the 
next sections, we use causal diagrams to show the structure of most of these biases, and 
discuss their correspondence to the epidemiologic terms of confounding, selection bias, and 
measurement bias. Because all these biases can occur under the null, we draw the causal 
diagrams under the causal null hypothesis, unless otherwise specified. (Any causal structure 
that results in bias under the null will also cause bias under the alternative that treatment has 
an effect on the outcome, but the converse is not true.) For each bias, we explain whether it 
affects the intention-to-treat effect or the per-protocol effect. Our definition of bias is the 
same as in Chapter 10 of reference 1 under either a randomization model or a correct 
population model.18,19 
 
Selection bias 
In its Risk of Bias Tool, Cochrane defines selection bias as the result of "systematic 
differences between baseline characteristics of the groups that are compared."4  The presence 
of “systematic differences between baseline characteristics” means that the distribution of 
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prognostic factors varies between the groups being compared. The bias may affect the 
estimate of the intention-to-treat effect and/or the estimate of the per-protocol effect, 
depending on the definition of “groups that are compared.” 
Let us first consider the case in which the “groups that are compared” are the 
randomized groups Z=1 and Z=0. There are at least three reasons why differences in the 
distribution of risk factors may arise. 
 
(i ) The assignment of patients to a group is influenced by knowledge of which treatment they 
will receive 
This bias can occur if the assignment that was not properly randomized or the 
randomized assignment was not sufficiently concealed, and so the person enrolling 
participants was aware of allocation sequence and influenced which patients were assigned to 
each group based on their prognostic factors. This situation is depicted by the causal diagram 
in Figure 1a that includes the prognostic factors L (e.g., CD4 count, viral load) as common 
causes of the outcome Y and the assignment Z. The arrow from L to Z may be due to the 
improperly randomized or insufficiently concealed allocation sequence. There are other 
causal diagrams that represent common causes of Z and Y (see, for example, Chapter 7 of 
Reference 1); we chose the simplest. 
Epidemiologists refer to biases that arise from the presence of common causes as 
confounding. The existence of common causes LZ of assignment Z and outcome Y introduces 
confounding bias for the intention-to-treat effect in an intention-to-treat analysis that 
compares individuals in groups Z=1 and Z=0, and for the per-protocol effect in a per-protocol 
analysis that compares individuals in groups Z=1 and Z=0 with A=Z. In both cases, the 
Cochrane Risk of Bias Tool refers to this bias as selection bias; see Table 1. 
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Appropriate randomization, generation and concealment of the allocation sequence, or 
adjustment for the prognostic factors L removes the L →Z arrow and therefore the 
confounding bias. 
Even under perfect randomization procedures, random imbalances in prognostic 
factors may bias intention-to-treat effect estimates. This so-called chance confounding20 
(sometimes referred to as allocation bias19or accidental bias18,21,22) is quantitatively addressed 
by frequentist confidence intervals and is mitigated by adjusting for measured prognostic 
factors that are imbalanced.1,10 Unlike the structural confounding depicted in Figure 1a, 
chance confounding is expected to become smaller as sample size increases. 
 
(ii) The decision to recruit a patient is influenced by knowledge of which treatment the 
patient will receive. 19,21 
This bias can occur if an investigator is aware of the random sequence and decides to 
enroll patients with certain prognostic factors only if they are known to be assigned to a 
particular treatment strategy. The Cochrane Risk of Bias Tool describes this problem: 
"Knowledge of the next assignment […] can cause selective enrolment of participants on the 
basis of prognostic factors. Participants who would have been assigned to an intervention 
deemed to be ‘inappropriate’ may be rejected."4 
The causal diagram in Figure 1b represents this scenario. The node S is the selection 
into the trial (1: yes, 0: no), which depends on the values of assignment Z and prognostic 
factors L. The box around S indicates that the analysis is restricted to those with S=1. This 
bias arises from the selection of a subset of the potential study population into the analysis 
and, because S is a common effect of assignment and prognostic factors, both intention-to-
treat and per-protocol analyses may be biased even if both effects are truly null. 
Epidemiologists10 and Cochrane refer to this bias as selection bias (Table 1). 
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The elimination of this selection bias requires removing the Z →S arrow through 
appropriate concealment of the allocation sequence, or adjustment for the prognostic factors 
L. 
 
(iii) The decision to adhere to the assigned treatment is influenced by prognostic factors 
This may result in an imbalance between the groups A=1 and A=0, but not between the 
groups Z=1 and Z=0. Therefore this imbalance will not bias the intention-to-treat estimate, 
but will generally bias the per-protocol estimate of a naïve per-protocol analysis. This third 
case is not addressed by the Cochrane Risk-of-Bias Tool. 
The causal diagram in Figure 1c represents this scenario. The node UA stands for 
common causes (e.g., symptoms resulting from severe immunosuppression) of adherence to 
treatment A and outcome Y.2 The node S is the variable selection into the per-protocol 
population (1: yes, 0: no), which depends on the values of Z and A (S=1 if Z=A, S=0 if Z≠A), 
and the analysis is restricted to those with S=1.  
Epidemiologists may refer to this bias as selection bias because it arises from the 
selection of a subset (the per-protocol population) of the study population into an analysis 
that compares Z=1 vs. Z=0. However, note that this selection bias for the per-protocol effect 
only arises when there is confounding of the effect of A due to common causes UA of A and 
Y.  
Regardless of whether we refer to this bias as confounding or selection bias, reducing 
it requires either a masked design or a non-naïve, more realistic per-protocol analysis that 
adjusts for the variables UA or their proxies. Because a per-protocol analysis compares groups 
not entirely defined by randomization, the analysis is subject to the biases usually associated 
with observational studies. 
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Finally, let us consider the case in which the “groups that are compared” are the non-
randomized groups A=1 and A=0, i.e., an as-treated analysis. Because as-treated analyses are 
effectively observational analyses, their estimates of the per-protocol effect will be 
confounded in the presence of common causes of treatment A and the outcome Y. The 
structure of the bias is shown by the causal diagram in Figure 1d. In subsequent diagrams we 
will omit the common causes of A and Y to avoid clutter and to focus the attention on the 
other sources of bias.  
 
Performance bias 
The Cochrane Risk of Bias Tool defines performance bias as the result of "systematic 
differences between groups in the care that is provided, or in exposure to factors other than 
the interventions of interest."3 These differences may occur due to knowledge of the assigned 
treatment Z by study participants and thus will be less likely in masked trials. 
Again let us first consider the case in which the “groups that are compared” are the 
randomized groups Z=1 and Z=0. Consider the causal diagram in Figure 2a, where O 
represents medical interventions that are forbidden by the study protocol (e.g., an intensive 
monitoring and treatment of cardiovascular risk factors) and UO represents unmeasured 
common causes of O and Y (e.g., risk factors for cardiovascular disease). The arrow from Z to 
O indicates that awareness of the assigned treatment might lead to changes in the behavior of 
study participants or their doctors, which in turn may affect the outcome, hence an arrow 
from O to Y. The interventions O are a result of assignment Z itself, and therefore just 
mediators of the effect of Z.  
Because the intention-to-treat effect is the effect of assignment and part of the effect 
of assignment is mediated through O, then O cannot be viewed as a source of bias. The 
intention-to-treat effect naturally incorporates the effects of deviations from protocol, 
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including the interventions O. That is, in an intention-to-treat analysis whose goal is to 
estimate the intention-to-treat effect, performance bias cannot occur. In epidemiologic terms, 
there is no confounding or selection bias. 
However, the Cochrane literature appears to suggest that performance bias can occur 
even in intention-to-treat analyses. To explore this issue, consider two types of departures 
from intended interventions 
(i) Departures from intended interventions that might happen in real life 
When trial participants receive interventions O that are prohibited by the protocol but that 
they would have also received outside of the trial, we believe that most people would agree 
with the conclusion that no performance bias exists in intention-to-treat analyses. 
 
(ii) Departures from intended interventions that arise only because of the randomized trial 
context 
When trial participants receive interventions O that are prohibited by the protocol and that 
they would have not received outside of the trial, the intention-to-treat effect estimated from 
the trial is relatively unhelpful for patients outside the trial. This may be a reason why 
Cochrane uses the performance bias label for randomized trials. However, the use of the word 
“bias” in this context needs to be carefully qualified. 
In the absence of any of the other biases discussed here, an intention-to-treat analysis 
of a trial in which interventions O occur is an unbiased estimator of the intention-to-treat 
effect in that particular trial context and population. The presence of interventions O, like 
other trial-specific characteristics (e.g., eligibility criteria, monitoring) do not affect the 
estimates’ internal validity but that may affect their external validity (e.g,  if the estimate 
cannot be transported to clinical contexts outside of the trial in which the interventions O are 
less frequent). In this case, it might be more appropriate to say that the intention-to-treat 
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effect from the trial is not generalizable or transportable to other settings rather than saying 
that it is “biased”. 
Another reason why Cochrane uses the performance bias label for intention-to-treat 
analysis of randomized trials is that the implicit research question may not be about the pure 
intention-to-treat effect, but rather an intention-to-treat effect where the only deviation in 
protocol is non-adherence to the assigned treatment i.e., the research question is neither 
intention-to-treat effect nor per-protocol effect. Thus, different research questions might lead 
to different categorizations of bias.    
Performance bias may occur when estimating the per-protocol effect via either a per-
protocol or an as-treated analysis. There are at least two distinct reasons for the bias to arise. 
Figure 2b depicts a setting in which deviations from protocol O are affected by the 
received treatment (e.g., because the use of certain therapies prompts doctors conduct tests 
for cardiovascular risk factors that were forbidden by the protocol). The per-protocol effect is 
then the direct effect of treatment in the absence of those deviations from protocol O (e.g., if 
no tests for cardiovascular factors had been conducted). Unfortunately, per-protocol and as-
treated analyses will yield a biased direct effect (per-protocol) estimate whether they do or do 
not adjust for O (Table 1). Lack of adjustment will result in bias because the effect estimate 
will include the indirect effect as well; adjustment for O but not also for all confounders of 
the effect of O on the outcome (e.g., UO),11 will generally result in selection bias (in graph 
theoretic terms, O is a collider). 
Performance bias for the per-protocol effect may also have the same structure as 
confounding. Figure 2c represents a setting in which O operates as a confounder of the effect 
of A on Y. The arrow from O to A indicates that interventions not specified in the protocol 
(e.g., intensive monitoring of cardiovascular risk factors) may alter treatment received during 
the follow-up (e.g., the presence of cardiovascular risk factors leads doctors to prescribe a 
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different type of antiretroviral therapy). With time-varying variables A and O, the structures 
represented in Figures 2b and 2c can occur simultaneously. 
 
Detection bias 
The Cochrane Risk-of-Bias Tool defines detection bias as the result of "systematic 
differences between groups in how outcomes are determined".4 This bias (also called 
observer, ascertainment, or assessment bias) occurs if knowledge of a patient’s assigned 
strategy influences outcome assessment. Figure 3a represents detection bias for the intention-
to-treat effect. In this graph the true outcome Y remains unmeasured and Y* represents the 
mismeasured outcome. The arrows from Z and Y to Y* represent that outcome measurement 
depends on both the true outcome Y and the treatment assignment Z. An intention-to-treat 
estimate of the effect of Z on Y* from Figure 3a will be biased for the intention-to-treat effect 
of Z on Y; the bias is a consequence of mismeasurement of Y, and is commonly referred to as 
"measurement bias" or “information bias” in epidemiology (Table 1).1,6,12 The type of 
measurement error represented in Figure 3a is differential with respect to treatment 
assignment1,5 and therefore, like all other biases discussed previously, leads to bias even if Z 
has no effect on Y. 
Detection bias may affect per-protocol effect estimates either directly if A affects Y*, 
as in Figure 3b, or indirectly, as in Figure 3c, if Z is a common cause of A and Y*. 
Measurement bias in Figures 3a-c can be avoided by masking of outcome assessors, because 
it removes the Z→Y* arrow or the A→Y* arrow. 
 
Attrition bias 
The Cochrane Risk of Bias Tool defines attrition bias as the result of "systematic differences 
between groups in withdrawals from a study".4 The source of bias is differential loss-to-
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follow-up (e.g., drop out) or other forms of exclusions from the analysis. Figure 4a includes 
the censoring indicator C, which takes value 1 for individuals excluded from the analysis. 
The box around C=0 indicates that the analysis is restricted to those who were not excluded 
from the analysis. The arrow from Z to C indicates that withdrawal from the analysis is 
influenced by knowledge of the participant’s group assignment, e.g., patients assigned to less 
potent combination antiretroviral therapy are more likely to not attend future visits if they 
were aware of their assigned treatment. The arrow from L to C indicates that individuals with 
worse prognosis (L=1) are more likely to be excluded than the others (with L=0), because the 
severity of their disease prevents them from attending future study visits. In graph-theoretic 
terms, the intention-to-treat effect estimate is biased because, even under the null, the path 
Z→C←L→Y is open when conditioning on the collider C. This bias is another example of 
what epidemiologists refer to as selection bias (Table 1).1,10 
The per-protocol effect estimate is also subject to attrition bias. The bias may arise 
directly if A affects censoring C (e.g., subjects receiving A=1 are at a greater risk of 
experiencing side effects, which could lead them to dropout), as in Figure 4b, or indirectly, as 
in Figure 4c, if Z is a common cause of A and C. In Figures 4a and 4c, masking of 
participants and doctors providing care can prevent attrition bias for intention-to-treat and 
per-protocol effect estimates by removing the Z→C arrow, and thus blocking the biasing 
paths Z→C←L→Y and A←Z→C←L→Y, respectively. Adjustment for  L also in Figures 4a-
c also adjusts for selection bias. 
 
Reporting bias 
The Cochrane Risk of Bias Tool defines reporting bias as the result of "systematic differences 
between reported and unreported findings".4 Outcome reporting bias may occur because so-
called statistically significant effect estimates are more likely to be reported than 
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nonsignificant effect estimates. Then the average published result will be farther from the null 
than the true average result, which will bias meta-analyses and systematic reviews.23 A 
similar bias, "stepwise selection", results in inflated estimated for weak effects, sometimes 
known as testimation (estimation after testing) bias.24-26 Reporting bias, which applies to both 
intention-to-treat and per-protocol effects, is negligible when treatment has a strong effect on 
the outcome or the trial size is huge.24,25 
Epidemiologists have long warned against the problems resulting from abuse of 
significance testing and selective reporting after multiple comparisons.27,28 Because reporting 
bias of individual studies is not a structural bias, it cannot be generally represented using the 
causal diagrams. 
 
Discussion 
We described how the terminology used to describe similar biases differs between 
trialists and epidemiologists, and why an explicit specification of the causal target of each 
randomized trial is beneficial when discussing the risk of bias. For example, making the 
intention-to-treat the target allows trialists to stop worrying about some forms of 
“performance bias”. On the other hand, making the per-protocol effect the target makes it 
clear that adjustment for pre- and post-randomization confounding is needed, which has 
implications for the design and analysis of RCTs.29 
We encourage trialists and epidemiologists to be more explicit about their inferential 
goals. In particular, an open question is whether trialists conducting intention-to-treat 
analyses are really interested in the intention-to-treat effect. The widespread preference for 
masked studies suggests that the per-protocol effect, which is not affected by differential 
implementation of the treatment strategies being compared, may be the ultimate target.  
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Causal diagrams help reduce confusion created by ambiguous terminology.30 For 
example, the term selection bias is used with different meanings by trialists and 
epidemiologists. Drawing the corresponding causal diagram helps resolve these confusions. 
The structural approach to bias using causal diagrams also shows that some biases that are 
described using different terms in the RCT literature have the same structure. For example, 
Figures 1b and 4a are essentially the same apart from the time and reason for selection.    
Our simplistic graphical presentations of the Cochrane selection, performance, 
detection and attrition biases cannot possibly cover all possibilities. Specifically, in trials with  
time-varying treatments and attrition, Robins’s g-methods (g-formula, inverse-probability 
weighting, g-estimation) are generally needed to properly adjust for time-varying 
confounding and selection bias when estimating intention-to-treat and per-protocol effects.16 
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Figure 2c. Per-protocol effect: Cochrane performance bias / Epidemiologic confounding a in 
per-protocol or as-treated analysis 
Figure 3a. Intention-to-treat effect: Cochrane detection bias/ Measurement bias due to 
outcome misclassification in an intention-to-treat analysis 
Figure 3b. Per-protocol effect: Cochrane detection bias/ Measurement bias due to outcome 
misclassification in a per-protocol or as-treated analysis 
Figure 3c. Per-protocol effect: Cochrane detection bias/ Measurement bias due to outcome 
misclassification in a per-protocol or as-treated analysis 
Figure 4a. Intention-to-treat effect: Cochrane attrition bias/ Selection bias due to differential 
loss-to-follow-up in an intention-to-treat analysis 
Figure 4b. Per-protocol effect: Cochrane attrition bias/ Selection bias due to differential loss 
to follow-up in a per-protocol or as-treated analysis 
Figure 4c. Per-protocol effect: Cochrane attrition bias/ Selection bias due to differential loss 
to follow-up in a per-protocol or as-treated analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
 
 
Table 1- Translation of Cochrane bias in randomized trials domains into common 
epidemiologic terms 
 
Cochrane bias 
domain 
Epidemiologic term Bias in intention-to-
treat/per-protocol 
effects 
 
Selection bias Confounding or 
selection bias* 
Yes/Yes 
Performance bias Biased direct effect 
or confounding** 
No/Yes 
Detection bias Measurement bias Yes/Yes 
Attrition bias Selection bias Yes/Yes 
Reporting bias Non-structural bias that 
cannot be represented 
in our causal diagrams 
Yes/Yes 
 
 
L             Z             Y         
Figure 1a. Intention-to-treat effect: Cochrane selection 
bias/Epidemiologic confounding in an intention-to-treat 
analysis
L         Z         S=1        Y 
Figure 1b. Intention-to-treat effect: Cochrane selection 
bias/Epidemiologic selection bias in an intention-to-treat 
analysis
UA Z         A        S=1     Y 
Figure 1c. Per-protocol effect: Cochrane selection bias/ 
Epidemiologic selection bias in a per-protocol analysis
UA Z         A        Y 
Figure 1d. Per-protocol effect: Cochrane selection bias/ 
Epidemiologic confounding in an as-treated analysis
UO Z           O           Y
Figure 2a. Intention-to-treat effect: Cochrane RCT 
performance bias is not a bias in intention-to-treat analyses
UO              Z           A           O          Y
Figure 2b. Per-protocol effect: Cochrane performance bias/ 
Biased direct effect in a per-protocol or as-treated analysis
Z           O           A          Y
Figure 2c. Per-protocol effect: Cochrane performance bias / 
Epidemiologic confounding a in per-protocol or as-treated 
analysis
Z           Y           Y*
Figure 3a. Intention-to-treat effect: Cochrane detection bias/ 
Measurement bias due to outcome misclassification in an 
intention-to-treat analysis
Z          A          Y          Y*
Figure 3b. Per-protocol effect: Cochrane detection bias/ 
Measurement bias due to outcome misclassification in a per-
protocol or as-treated analysis
Z          A          Y          Y*
Figure 3c. Per-protocol effect: Cochrane detection bias/ 
Measurement bias due to outcome misclassification in a per-
protocol or as-treated analysis
L         Z           C=0        Y 
Figure 4a. Intention-to-treat effect: Cochrane attrition bias/ 
Selection bias due to differential loss-to-follow-up in an 
intention-to-treat analysis
L         Z         A        C=0     Y 
Figure 4b. Per-protocol effect: Cochrane attrition bias/ 
Selection bias due to differential loss to follow-up in a per-
protocol or as-treated analysis
L         Z         A        C=0     Y 
Figure 4c. Per-protocol effect: Cochrane attrition bias/ 
Selection bias due to differential loss to follow-up in a per-
protocol or as-treated analysis
